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The exact mechanism of dream production is still poorly understood. Based on 
exploratory findings that damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not cause 
changes in these patients suhjective experience of their dreams (Solms. 1(97). a study 
\\ as conducted in order to investigate the role of this area in dream production. The 
dreams of se\en patients \\ ith damage to tile dorsolateral prefrontal cortex \vere 
compared with those of normal participants. A content analysis found no significant 
quantitative dillerences hetween the dreams of dorsolateral prefrontal patients and 
normal controls. In addition. none of the patients \\ith damage to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex reported an y suhject i ve changes in t hei r dreams since fall i ng ill. 
These findings arc congruent with those or numerous neuroimaging studies. which 
indicate that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is deactivated during dreaming. and 
provide support for the theory that deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
during sleep accounts for many of the formal features of dreams. 
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Despite the fact that dreaming forms an integral part of the mental life of almost all 
humans. we still know very little about how the hrain generates dreams and why they 
are generated. Gi\en that dreams are entirely suhjectiw phenomena and that research 
into changes In dreaming following hrain I n.1 LWv is therefore plagued hy 
methodological prohlems. the paucity of our present kml\\ledge is perhaps not so 
surprising. Based on claims that damage to the dorsolateral frontal region of the brain 
does not cause any changes in these patients' suhjective experience of their dreams 
(50Ims. 1997). a study was done in order to investigate whether this area of the brain 
plays a role in the mechanism of dreaming. Thus the hypothesis investigated was that 
damage to the dorsolateral frontal lohes causes no significant changes in normal 
dream production. This was achieved hy comparing the dreams of patients with 
damage to the dorsolateral frontal lohes with those of normal participants. The 
rationale of the study was that it is theoretically as important to estahlish which 
anatomical structures and neuropsychological runctions are inessential to dreaming as 
it is to estahlish \\hich structures and functions arc essential. Thus the stud\ aimed to 
provide empirical evidence to support key theoretical m()dels of the dream process 
and thereby to contrihute to the small. but fertile I'ield of dream research. 
1.1. Defining dreaming 
Dreaming can be defined as Imagery that consists of sensory hallucinations. 
emotions. story-like or dramatic progressions. and bil.alTeness" (Nielsen. 2000. p. 
85l) experienced during sleep. However. as Nielsen (2000) points out. there is no 
standardized definition of dreaming. and definitions often \ary from study to study. 
Hohson (1988) has identified rive major characteristic features of dreams. These are: 
often strongly felt emotions. illogical content and mganization. sensor) Iml1resslons. 
an uncritical acceptance of events depicted in the dream. howc\er bizarre. and 
difficulty in remembering the dream upon a\\akening. Attempts ha\e heen made to 
differentiate between ordinary dreams. more elahorate. \i\id and intense forms of 
dreams (such as nightmares. for example) and othcr forms of cognitive activity. such 
as thinking. or the experience of vague and fragmentary impressions. during sleep 
(Nielsen. 2(00). However. such attcmpts are ortcn hampered hy ill-developed coding 










At this point it is also important to note that the word "dream" can have various 
meanings. Thus it can refer to a subjective experience during sleep. the memory of 
that subjective experience upon awakening. or that which is reported to others 
(Domhoff. 1996). Since a dream only attains objecti\'e existence once it is reported. 
the present study will only deal with dreams in this sense. what Domhoff (1996) calls 
the "dream report" or "dream narrative." This reliance on the dream report as the 
onl\ means of accessing the drcam experlcnce is prohahly the foremost 
methodological problem in dream research. Given that dreaming takes place during 
sleep. and active dream recall. as well as the recording of the dream. only upon 
awakening. the continuity between dream experiences and the beliefs about them 
cannot he taken for granted (Beaulieu-Prevost & Zandra . .2005a: Hohson. Pace-
Schott. & Stickgold . .20(0). Thus recent studies have. for example. shown that factors 
such as memory. personality and individual biases can influence self-reported 
evaluations of dream recall frequency (Beaulieu-Prevost & Zandra . .2005b). and that 
individual differences in dream recall frequency can influence people's beliefs 
regarding the content of their dreams (Beaulieu-Prevost & Zandra . .2005a). These 
kinds of methodological problems and their impact on the current study are discussed 
in more detai I I atcr. For nm,\'. \ve t urn our at tent i on to some of t he most promi nent 
theoretical models of the dream process. 
1.2. Dreams as a function of REM sleep'? 
When it was discovered that humans spend about .2Y7r of their sleeping hours in a 
state characterised by paradoxical cerebral activation and rapid eye movement (REM) 
(Asterinsky & Kleitman. 1953). it became possible to measure the physiological 
parameters of REM sleep and its correlation with drcam reports. Findings indicating 
that normal subjects report dream experiences in 70 -95'/r of awakenings from REM 
sleep (Dement & Kleitman. 1957). led to the belief that REM sleep is the 
physiological equI\alent of cireaming (Hohson & McCarlev. 1977: Solms . .20(0). 
This prompted a radical departure from Freud's psycho,lIlalytic dream theory. which 
saw dreams as the product of a defenSive transformation of uncunscious wishes found 
unacceptable by consciousness (Freud. 1l)()O/ 1976). and led to the de\elopment of one 
of the most influential theoretical models of dreaming namely: the activation-
s ynthesi s model. Developed by Hobson and coli eagucs. thi s mocle I desc ri be dreams 










internal data. present due to random acti\ation or the hrain during REM sleep 
(Hohson & McCarley. 1977: Hohson. 1(88). Hohson' s model is hased on the 
pioneering \vork of Jouvet (1962) whose ahlation. stimulation and recording studies 
showed that REM sleep is controlled by pontine brain stem mechanisms. This 
became the central tenet of the activation-synthesis model. leading Hobson and 
McCarley ( 1(77) to believe that the forehrain played an entirely passive role in the 
dream process and that all causal stimuli that create dream imagery arise "from the 
pontine brain stem and not in cognitive areas of the cerebrum" (p. 1347). 
Ho\vever. as Solms (2000) points out. these propositions can be questioned on the 
basis of se\eral contradictory findings. the first of which is the fact that not all 
dreaming is correlated with REM sleep. Thus studies indicate that complex mentation 
can be elicited in between 4](;( and 5CY'/r of non-REM (T'-iREM) awakenings (Foulkes. 
1962: Nielsen. 19(9). Although Hohson and colleagues do not dispute these results, 
they do query the extent to which the reported mentation can be called ""dreams". 
since there seems to he qualitative differences hetween NREM and REM dreams 
(Hobson et al.. 20(0), with NREM dreams being more "thoughtlike" and less bizarre 
than REM dreams (cf. Nielsen. 20(0). Despite this objection, Hobson's revised 
activation-synthesis model. the Activation-Input-Mode [AIMl model docs take into 
accollnt the fact that at least some NREM dreams are indistinguishable from REM 
dreams (Hohson. 1988: Rechtschaffen. 197]). And although the claim that all dreams 
are generated by the same hrain stem mechanisms that produce REM sleep has been 
abandoned. the claim that pontine hrain stem mechanisms generate all dreams has 
been retained (Hohson. 1992: Sol ms, 200()). The new model thercl'ore conceptualises 
hoth REM and NREM dreams as heing "a function of the physiological condition of 
the reciprocally interacting brain stem neuronal populations that constitute the sleep-
cycle control oscillator" (Hobson, 1992. p. 228). 
This shift in the theory implies. according to Solms (2000) that it should be 
possihle to demonstrate that dreaming is eliminated due to lesions to the brain stem. 
This method is however problematic since lesions that arc large enough to eliminate 
hoth REM and NREM usually destroy consciousness altogether (Hohson et aI., 2000: 
Solms.200{)). This has led Solms (2000) to irl\'estigate the corollary hypothesis of the 
AIM model: that dreaming is not controlled hy forehrain mechanisms. On the hasis 
of his O\\n findings. as well ,IS an e\tensi\e revie\\ of the literature. Soirns (2000) 










dreaming, "the lesion was localized to the forehrain - and the pontine brain stem was 
completely spared - in all hut one case" (p. 8-1-6). ,-\noneria (loss of dreaming) was 
found to be specifically associated with lesions to the posterior cOJ1\exity of the 
hemispheres, in or near the parieto-temporo-occipital junction - bilaterally as well as 
unilaterally - and to the white matter surrounding the frontal horns of the lateral 
ventricles bilaterally (Solms, 1997~ 20(0). Moreover. the REM state was found to be 
completely preserved in those cases in which the sleep cycle was evaluated (Solms, 
2000). Solms (2000) not only contends that dreaming can be terminated by forebrain 
lesions which spare the REM cycle, but also that forebrain mechanisms can initiate 
dreams in the ahsence of REM sleep. As evidence for this he takes the phenomenon 
of nocturnal seizures, which usually take place in NREM sleep (Kellaway & Frost, 
1(83). A revie\\ of the literature (cL Solms, 20(0) suggests that the foci or lesion in 
the case of these kinds of seizures is almost always located in the temporal lobe (i.e. 
in the forehrain) and unsurprisingly, given the \\ell-estahlished connection hetween 
fear and temporal lohe seizures (Heilman, Bowers and Valenstein, 1(93), often take 
the form of recurring nightmares. Additional findings by Penfield and colleagues 
(penfield, 1938~ Penfield & Rasmussen, 19))), which showed that stimulation of the 
temporal lohe focus could ani ricially reproduce these anxious experiences, 
strengthens Solms' (2000) argument. This led Solms (2000) to conclude that REM 
sleep and dreaming are most probably controlled by different brain mechanisms and 
are therefore doubly dissociable states. This theory therefore holds that any brain 
state that invol\es cerebral activation during sleep wi II simultaneously generate 
dreams (Solms, 20()()). This position is not far rem(l\Cd from that of Hobson and 
colleagues, \\hose AIM model suggests that conscious states. including the experience 
of dreaming "shO\\ a clear-cut dependence on hrain activation level" (Hobson et aI., 
2000, p. -1-0). However. whereas Solms (2()()()) holds that dreaming will only occur if 
and when the general activation of the hrain activates specific dopaminergic circuits 
situated in the ventromesial forehrain, Hohson's AIM model maintains that the 
dreaming state is the direct consequence of a shift in modulatory balance from 
aminergic (i.e. serotonin and noreprinephrine) to cholinergic (i.e. acetylcholine) 
during REM sleep (Hobson et al.. 2(00). 
Despite the debate as to whether dreams are exclusively initiated hy pontine hrain 
stem mechanisms or not. a coherent picture is starling tn e\ol\c regarding the 










of these structures and their implications for our undcrstanding of the mechanism of 
dreaming are hriefly discussed helow. 
1.3. The Neuroanatomy of dreaming 
Most of our knO\\ledge regarding the forchrain structures in\ohcd in the 
mechanism of dreaming is derived from clinico-anatomical studies (Solms. 1l)l)7) and 
functional neuroimaging studies (Braun et al .. 1997. 1l)l)8: Franck et al.. 1987: Heiss 
et al .. 198): Madsen et al .. 1991: Maquet et al .. 1l)l)6: Nofzinger et al .. 1997). The 
remarkahly consistent picture derived from these two methods (Hohson et al .. 2000). 
has done a great deal to inform our understanding of the mechanism of dreaming. 
However. before discussing these results it is important to note some of the 
methodological limitations of both these methods. Thus clinieo-anatomical studies 
are relatively blunt instruments when it comes to revealing mechanistic and functional 
details. given that they "cannot discriminate hetween the ellects of the destruction and 
the disconnection and cannot target specific neuronal groups in heterogeneous 
regions" (Hohson et al .. 2000. p. I)). Neuroimaging studies. such as those measuring 
cerebral hlood f10\\. suffer from the same constraint hecause they measure global 
activation and cann(\t identify small hut innuential neuronal populations (Hobson et 
a!. 2(00). In addition. the interpretation of neuroimaging studies. such as positron 
emission tomography (PET). is problematic because it is impossible to determine 
whether increased activity is inhihitory or excitatory (Hobson et al .. 2000; Solms. 
19(7). Other methodological constraints mentioned hy Hobson et al. (2000) include 
small sample sizes used in some ncuroimaging studics. the possihility that the 
functional activity of a hrain area may vary v"ith changes in its inputs, and the 
possihility that normal functional disconnections that occur during RE:v1 sleep may 
result in the same neural structures performing differing tasks depending on the state 
the brain is in. Despite these limitations. the fi11llings of neuroimaging studie..; have 
been consistently replicated by several independent groups and are holstered in their 
validity hy the complementary findings of lesion studies (Hohson et aI., 20(0). 
1.3.1. The effects of brain damage on dreaming 
Although hrain-damaged patients often exhibit presened dreaming. their dreams 
are often highly abnormal (Solms, 1(97). In his exploratory study of the clinico-










follO\\ing brain 1I1Jury into two broad categories: (al deficits in dreaming or dream 
imagery, \\hich include cessation or restriction of visual dream-imagery and global 
cessation or reduction of dreaming and (b) execs,l('s of dreaming or dream-imagery, 
which includes increased frequency and vivacity of dreaming and recurring 
nightmares, His research has shown that these abnormalities all involve different 
brain structures and varieties of neuropsychological dysfunction 
As mentioned ahove, "global anoneria", or total cessation of dreaming was found 
to be associated \\ith either posterior cortical or deep bi lateral frontal lesions. The 
anterior \ ariant of glohal anonena is hypothesised to he caused hy a disconnection of 
the mediobasal frontal cortex from the hrain stem and diencephalic limbic areas 
(Hobson et aI., 2(00) and is associated with adynamia and lack of \'olition (Solms, 
1997). This implies, according to Solms (200m that "moti\ational mechanisms are 
essential for the generation of dreams" (p. 8-J.8). In corroboration of this, a 
neuroimaging study reported increased activation of the caudal orbital frontal area 
during REM sleep in comparison to \vaking and NREM sleep (Braun et aL 1(97). In 
the posterior variant global anoneria is seen as the result of lesions in the parieto-
temporo-occipital,iunction of either hemisphere. Right-sided lesions \\ere found to he 
associated \\ith disorders of spatial cognition, whilst left ~idecllcsi()ns \\ere associated 
with disorclers of quasi-spatial (symholic) operations (Soirns, 19(7). This suggests 
that both symbolic quasi-spatial functions and concrete spatial functions are 
fundamental to the process of dreaming (Solms, 1997: 20(0). This finding is 
supported hy evidence from a neuroimaging study that shO\\ed acti\ation of the right 
inferior parietal cortex during REM sleep (Maquet et al. 19(6). 
Solms (1997) makes a distinction between global anoneria and a second syndrome 
called '\'i sual anoneri a" or non-vi sual dreami ng. Th is di sorder. fi rst s ystematicall y 
formulated by Doricchi and Violani (1992), is characterized hy a full or partial loss of 
visual dream imagery and is associated with the inahility to produce mental imagery 
in waking lifc. This syndrome is assOCiated with hi lateral lesions to medial-occipito-
temporal cortex (especially areas VJ, VJa, V-J., hut not VI, \'.'), or V6) (Solms, 1997: 
20(0). Similarly, Braun and colleagues ha\'e found acti\ation of the extrastriate 
visual cortex, hut not the striate visual cortex, during REV1 sleep (Braun et al. 1997: 
19(8) 
In terms of excesses of dreaming and dream imagery, Solms (1997) noted that 










anterior cingulate. and mesial frontal cortex) cause cxcessively \iviJ and frequent 
dreaming. This symptom-complcx is associated with a hreakdown in of the 
distinction het\\een drcaming and waking cognition as \\ell as other reality-
monitoring Jcficits. According to Solms (2000) inhihition of these structures during 
sleep may account for the hallucinated. delusional. disorientated. and paramnestic 
quality of dream cognition. Neuroimaging studies indicate that the thalamus, basal 
forebrain. medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate areas are all selectively activated 
during REM sleep. hut deactivated Juring NREM sleep (Braun et a!.. 1997: Maquet et 
a!.. 1996: Nofzinger et al. 1(96). Given that REM dreams are generally more vivid 
than NREM dreams (Hobson. 1(88). one \\ould expect the opposite to he the case. if 
SoiTns' (2000) hypothesis was correct. Howc\cr. although this indicates a 
discrepancy het\\ecn the clinico-anatomical and ncuroimaging findings. Hohson et al. 
(2000) cautions that lesions in these areas could just as \\ell he initative as destructive 
and that lesions to different areas of this functionally highly heterogeneous region 
could cause dramatically different effects. 
The second symptom complex identi fied hy Solms (1997). recurring nightmares. is 
(as discussed above) associated with discharging lesions in the medial and anterior 
temporal cortex and is associated with unpleasant hallucinatory experiences during 
\vaking (Soirns. 1997: 2(00). 
These findings providc ovcrwhelming evidencc that specific forchrain structures 
are invohed in gcncration of dream im<lgcry and thus prmide a great deal of support 
for Solms' (1997) theory. Neuroimaging findings that indicate activation of limhic 
and paralimbic regions. specifically the anterior and lateral hypothalamic areas. the 
amygdaloid complex and septal-ventral striatal areas during REM sleep (Braun ct ai, 
1997: Maquet et al. 1996: Nofzinger ct al .. 1997) has also led to a rc\ision of 
Hobson's original theory (Hohson & McCarlcy. 1977). Thus hc now admits that 
there is a greater degree of forehrain control of both REM sleep and the dream 
proccss than he previously thought (Hobson et al .. 2(00). 
Howevcr it is theoretically as important to estahlish which anatomical structures 
and neuropsychological functions arc incssential to dreaming as it is to estahlish 
which structures and functions arc csscntial (Solms. 1l)97). Thus studics have found 
that the heteromodal association arcas (specifically the dnrsolateral prefrontal and 
inferior parietal cortices) arc deactivatcd during hoth REM and NREM slcep (Braun 











the brain hypothesised to have no input in the dream process, namely the area of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal lohes (Solnls, 1<)<)7). 
1.3.2. Brain damage and unchanged dreaming 
Solms' (1<)97) research found that normal (i.e. unchanged) dreaming correlated 
significantly with lesions to the dorsolateral frontal lobes. In addition, a lateralizing 
tendency \\as found, with normal dreaming being significantly higher in cases of 
lesions to the left hemisphere than to the right hemisphere. This led him to speculate 
that '"the dorsolateral frontal region (and perhaps the left dorsolateral prefrontal region 
in particular) plays no essential role in the normal dream process" (Solms, 1997, p. 
222). In corroboration of this, several H/'O PET studies have found significant 
deactivation of the dorsolateral fontal cortex during hoth REM (Braun et aI., 1997: 
Maquet et al .. 1997) and NREM sleep (Anderson et al .. 1<)<)8: Braun et al .. 1<)<)7). In 
addition, a single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) study conducted 
by Madsen and colleagues also found decreased hlood flow to frontal areas during 
REM sleep (Madsen et aI., 19<) I). However, these finding are contradicted hy a 
fluorodeoxyglucose (FOG) PET study conducted by Heiss and colleagues who 
compared cerehral glucose uptake during dreaming versus dreamless sleep and found 
increased. rather than decreased, superior frontal activity during dreams (Heiss et aI., 
1984). A more recent FOG PET study conducted by Nof/inger and colleagues also 
did not find a significant decrease of glucose uptake in the dorsolateral convexity 
when comparing REM sleep and waking (Nofzinger et al .. 19<)71. Methodological 
differences bet\\een FOG and H/'O methods may account for this discrepancy (see 
Braun et al .. 1997. Hobson et al .. 2()OO and Nof/inger et al. 1<)<)7 for discussions). 
On balance. it therefore seems that the evidence points towards the deactivation of 
the frontal eonvex.ity during dreaming (the implication of which will be discussed 
below). Howe\er. it is important to note that the only lesion study in this area had a 
severe methodological constraint. Solms' (1997) research relied upon a very 
subjective method in which patients were asked whcther or not their dreams have 
changed subsequent to neurological damage. and if so. in which ways. This method is 
problematic. since, as mentioned above. people's beliefs about the content of their 
dreams are influenced by a variety of factors (Beaulieu-Prevost & Zandra, 2005a). 
For example, individual differences ill dream recall frequency (ORF) have heen found 










Thus people's beliefs about the amount of anxiety present in their dreams were only 
related to the actual affective content of their dreams in individuals with high DRF. 
Conversely, in individuals with low DRF, beliefs regarding the amount of anxiety 
present in their dreams were related only to their current affective state (Beaulieu-
Prevost & Zandra, 2005a). It may therefore be that factors such as DRF may influence 
people's beliefs around other aspects of their dreams, such as the vivacity of visual 
dream imagery, narrative complexity, or emotional intensity. The present study 
aimed to address this methodological problem by using more objective measures. As 
such, it employed the use of blind raters in order to compare the dream reports of 
patients with damage to the frontal convexity with those of normal participants. If 
the frontal convexity plays no role in the normal dream process, a content analysis 
should reveal no quantitative differences between the dream reports of patients with 
damage to that area and normal participants. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Dreams and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
In his model of the normal dream process, Solms (1997) hypothesised that 
inhibition of the dorsolateral frontal convexity, together with the inhibition of spinal 
motoneurons, during sleep serve the purpose of preventing appetitive interests, 
aroused due to external sensory stimulation as well as endogenous stimulation, such 
as REM activation, from expressing themselves in volitional motor action. As 
discussed above, evidence for this line of reasoning comes from his own research, 
which indicate that patients with damage to the dorsolateral frontal convexity (and 
perhaps the left dorsolateral frontal convexity in particular) report no changes in their 
dreams subsequent to neurological illness (Solms, 1997), and is supported by the 
findings of several neuroimaging studies (Anderson et aI., 1998; Braun et aI., 1997; 
Madsen et aI., 1991; Maquet et aI., 1997). However, it is important to note that the 
deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during dreaming is only relative, and 
that lesions to this area may therefore further lower the activation, thus affecting the 
dream content of these patients. In addition, Solms' (1997) hypothesis of a left 
lateralizing tendency has not been confirmed as yet. In fact, his tentative finding has 
been contradicted by one neuroimaging study that compared decreases in cerebral 











hemispheric differences (Braun et ai., 1998). Solms' model is also contradicted by 
Foulkes' (1978) hypothesis that the left frontal areas of the brain contribute to the 
narrative element of dreams. According to this view, which has since been 
abandoned (Foulkes, 1996), dream narratives are mediated by the same left frontal 
areas, which, in the production of waking narratives, provide expressive speech with 
an intention or plan, and aid the subsequent recoding of that plan into speech 
(Foulkes, 1978). The left frontal lobe is therefore seen as imbuing speech with its 
predicative structure and logical coherence (Luria, 1973). However, given the erratic 
narrative structure of most dreams, it would perhaps not be so surprising if the 
prefrontal cortex - the part of the brain that is most involved in creating narrative 
structure - is inessential to the dream process (Solms, 1997). Thus Solms (1997) 
proposes that the bizarre nature of most dreams can be ascribed to dorsolateral 
prefrontal deactivation. 
Dreams are characterized by cognitive deficits in self-reflective awareness, 
orientation, and memory (Hobson, 1988; Hobson et ai., 2000). These formal 
characteristics of dreams have all been ascribed to the deactivation of the frontal 
convexity during sleep (Braun et ai., 1997; Maquet et ai., 1996). Given this, we now 
tum our attention to a closer examination of the functions of the dorsolateral frontal 
lobes. 
2.2. Behaviour and the frontal lobes 
The exact function of the prefrontal cortex has baffled generations of researchers, 
leading Teuber (1964) to describe it as "a riddle". However, a large body of research 
(comprising both animal and human studies) has provided us with a much clearer 
understanding of the diverse anatomical units that make up the prefrontal cortex, their 
connections with other areas of the brain, as well as their functions (Damasio & 
Anderson, 1993; Fuster, 1989; Passingham, 1993). Thus, research has shown that 
damage to the prefrontal cortex causes specific neuropsychological impairments 
depending on the site and size of the lesion, and that there is no single "frontal lobe 
syndrome" as such (Damasio & Anderson, 1993; Fuster, 1989). The prefrontal cortex 
is usually divided into three cortical surfaces: dorsolateral, orbital, and medial, and 
there is some evidence of differential involvement of each of these structures in some 
cognitive functions (Luria, 196611980; Stuss & Benson, 1986). However, 











define these areas are not always consistent and the use of a specific anatomical label 
does not always exclude pathology involving other areas (Stuss & Benson, 1986). In 
addition, results seem to vary depending on the definition of what is being measured 
(Stuss & Benson, 1986). Despite this, a new generation of researchers, making use of 
modem neuroimaging technologies, are elucidating the qualitative and quantitative 
differences between frontal subgroups in terms of their performance on different tasks 
(see for e.g. Reverberi et aI., 200Sa; Reverberi et aI., 200Sb; Simons et aI., 200S), and 
thereby confirming Luria's (1966/1980) observation that "different parts of the frontal 
lobes subserve different functions" (p. 360). 
Damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in humans is associated with specific 
disorders of attention, motility, and temporal integration (Fuster, 1989). In terms of 
disorders of attention, Luria (1966/1980) found that patients with damage to large 
portions of the dorsolateral frontal lobes showed a lowering of general awareness as 
illustrated by little or no interest in the environment and a general attitude of apathy. 
A lack of drive, called Antriebsschwache by Klages (19S4 cited in Fuster, 1989) 
seems to be the underlying deficit in these cases. This lowering of general awareness 
also extends to self-awareness, which is expressed by shallowness of interest, loss of 
self-concern and impairment in self-monitoring or the ability to self-correct (Stuss & 
Benson, 1986). In the case of disorders of motility, dorsolateral frontal patients may 
suffer from hypokinesis, a disorder characterized by a general decline of spontaneous 
motor activity, which may range from "aspontaneity" that mainly affects language 
and social behaviour (Fuster, 1989) to akinetic-abulic syndrome with mutism (Luria, 
1966/1980). Fuster (1989) distinguishes between disorders of general spontaneous 
motility and disorders of goal-directed behaviour. He classifies the later as a disorder 
of temporal integration, associated with concreteness and a constriction of the scope 
and complexity of behaviour, leading to stereotyped sequences of behaviour with little 
regard for either the origins of the sequence or its goals (Fuster, 1989). Interestingly, 
Fuster (1989) also classifies defective memory (due to attentional deficits), and 
defective planning associated with dorsolateral prefrontal damage as disorders of 
temporal integration. According to his theoretical model, the cardinal function of the 
prefrontal cortex is the temporal organization of behaviour. Thus the functions of the 
prefrontal cortex are seen as interrelated and mutually supportive of each other in 











According to Luria, the impairment of purposeful behaviour associated with 
damage to the dorsolateral frontal lobes can be seen as the product of the disruption of 
the regulatory role of language on behaviour (Luria & Homskaya, 1964; Luria, 
1966/1980). This view therefore sees both voluntary and involuntary motor activity 
are preceded and guided by internalised linguistic schemata. Disruption of such 
schemata cause what seems to be a dissociation between knowing and doing, with 
patients being unable to implement their volitional intensions, despite being able to 
move normally (Luria & Homskaya, 1964; Luria, 1966/1980). 
Both Luria's (1966/1988) and Fuster's (1989) theoretical models of the functions 
of the prefrontal cortex congruent with Solms' (1997) hypothesis that inhibition of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal convexity during dreaming will obstruct the expression of 
ideas into action. Thus the function of dorsolateral prefrontal deactivation during 
dreaming is most probably the preservation of sleep (Solms, 1997). If Solms' 
hypothesis is correct, lesions to this area should not disrupt the production of dreams 
in any way, and the dreams of these patients should therefore be indistinguishable 
from those of normal dreamers. 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Aims 
The aim of the present study was to confirm Solms' (1997) observation that that 
damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex seem to cause no significant changes in 
these patients' ability to produce dreams. In addition, we aimed to overcome some of 
the methodological problems associated with his study by making use of more 
objective measures. 
3.2. Design 
The present study made use of a natural experimental design, with dorsolateral 
frontal patients as the experimental group and non-brain damaged patients as the 
control group. Most recent dream reports were obtained from all participants and, 
after transcription, these were subject to a content analysis. The dreams of 
dorsolateral prefrontal patients were then compared with those of normal participants 
in order to ascertain whether there are any quantitative differences between the 











during sleep has been hypothesised to cause some of the striking cognitive deficits 
present in dreams (Braun et aI., 1997; Hobson et aI., 2000; Maquet et aI, 1996; Solms, 
2000), specific aspects of executive function and memory were evaluated in order to 
provide a clinical picture which would allow us to explain any differences, or lack 
thereof, between the dreams of dorsolateral prefrontal patients and those of control 
participants. 
3.3. Sample 
Twenty-five patients with focal frontal lobe damage as identified by computerized 
tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans were selected from the 
neurology and neurosurgery wards of Groote Schuur Hospital (Cape Town). Six 
patients were excluded on the basis of damage to mainly the mesial and orbital 
surfaces of the frontal lobes, rather than the frontal convexity. Four first-language 
Xhosa speaking patients could not converse fluently enough in English or Afrikaans 
to be tested in either of these languages and were therefore excluded. Three patients 
were discharged or referred to a long-term care facility outside the geographical area 
before testing could be completed and were therefore excluded. One patient passed 
away before testing could be completed. Four patients declined to participate. Seven 
patients (four females and three males) therefore participated in the study. None of 
these patients had a history of psychiatric disorders, substance abuse or a previous 
neurological disease. Three patients had damage to the right dorsolateral frontal lobe, 
two had damage to the left dorsolateral frontal lobe and two had bilateral damage. 
Seven normal volunteers (three females and four males), recruited from the 
orthopaedics ward constituted the control group. Controls and patients were matched 
for age and education (See Table 1). 
Table 1 




Mean age (S.D.) 42 (13.55) 















3.4. Ethical Considerations 
The study was conducted with ethical approval from the University of Cape 
Town's Department of Psychology and the Groote Schuur Hospital Ethics 
Committees. Given that the study took place in a hospital setting, the researcher was 
sensitive to the health of participants and those who were deemed to be too ill to 
participate immediately were given time to recuperate before being interviewed. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the administering of any 
tests (see appendix B). As the study had a low risk of inflicting either emotional or 
physical trauma, the need for oral debriefing was deemed unnecessary. The 
confidentiality of participants' dream reports and test results were protected. All 
audio- recordings made were suitably anonymised, securely stored, made accessible 
only to the investigator and destroyed at the end of the project. 
3.5. Instruments 
The following materials and instruments were used: a) a Demographic 
Questionnaire, b) a Most Recent Dream report (Hall & Van de Castle, 1966 cited in 
Domhoff, 1996), c) the Orientation test of the Mini Mental Status Exam (MMSE) 
(Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975), e) the Digits Forward test of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (W AIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981), f) various sub-tests of the 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001), 
g) two tests measuring verbal and visual memory respectively: i) the Babcock Story 
Recall Test (Babcock, 1930 cited in Lezak, 1995) and ii) the Rey Complex Figure 
Test (Rey, 1941 cited in Lezak, 1995). 
a) Demographic Questionnaire 
The demographic questionnaire included questions regarding age, gender, home 
language, level of education, history of psychiatric illness, history of substance 
abuse, description of current medical condition and diagnosis and CT or MRI scan 
report, if relevant (see Appendix A). 
b) Most Recent Dream Report 
All participants were subjected to an in-depth interview in which they were asked 











neurological illness (see Appendix A). The importance of reporting the most 
recent dream experienced was emphasized, since people have a tendency to 
report recurrent dreams or nightmares, or dreams which are especially unusual 
(Domhoff, 1996). The importance that the dream is dated after the onset of 
neurological illness is self-explanatory in this case. Some participants initially 
claimed that they do not dream, or that they do not remember their dreams. Any 
reported absence of dreaming was carefully explored. Since it was not expected 
that any of the dorsolateral frontal convexity patients would experience anoneria, 
they as well as those participants who did not remember their dreams were 
encouraged to pay careful attention to their dreams and to try to remember as 
much of them as possible. These participants were reinterviewed the following 
day or until a most recent dream report was obtained. In addition, all participants 
were asked whether they had experienced any changes in their dreams since 
falling ill. 
c) Orientation for time and place 
Orientation for time and place was assessed using the appropriate subtests of the 
MMSE (Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975). The test consists of five items 
measuring the participant's orientation for time (year, season, month, date and 
day of the week), as well as five items measuring orientation for place (country, 
province, city, hospital/building/home, and ward/cliniclfloor). Orientation can be 
defined as "the awareness of self in relation to one's surroundings" (Lezak, 1995, 
p.335), and requires consistent integration of attention, memory and perception. 
Although preserved orientation depends on the intactness and integration of many 
different mental activities (Lezak, 1995), and therefore has no localizing 
significance by itself, one would expect impaired orientation in dorsolateral 
prefrontal patients given the attentional deficits commonly associated with 
damage to this area (Fuster, 1989). 
d) Digits Forward Test 
The Digits Forward Test of the WAIS measures attentional capacity and consists 
of eight pairs of random number sequences that the examiner reads aloud at the 
rate of one number per second (Wechsler, 1981). As mentioned above, patients 











attention (Stuss & Benson, 1986), which often takes the form of a lowering of 
general awareness (Fuster, 1989). Digit span is considered to be highly 
vulnerable to brain damage, and is often impaired in patients with frontal lobe 
damage (Fuster, 1989; Stuss & Benson, 1986). 
e) Subtests of the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) 
The extent of executive dysfunction was determined using the following subtests 
of the D-KEFS: 
i. Trail Making Test (Condition 4: Number-Letter Switching) 
The task requires the examinee to switch back and forth between connecting 
numbers and letters in sequence. It measures the examinee's ability to engage 
in cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility is essential for higher-level skills 
such as multitasking, simultaneous processing, and divided attention (Delis, 
Kaplan & Kramer, 2001). Impaired performance on the switching condition 
of other versions of the Trail Making Test (i.e. as part of the Halstead-Reitan 
battery) has been found to be particularly sensitive to frontal lobe damage 
(Reitan, 1958 cited in Stuss & Benson, 1986). 
ii. Word-colour Interference Test (Condition 3: Inhibition) 
This test is based on the Stoop (1935) procedure and requires the examinee's 
to inhibit an over-learned verbal response (reading the words) in order to 
generate a conflicting response (naming the colour of the ink the words are 
written in) (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001). Poor performance of this task is 
seen as reflecting deficits in concentration (Lezak, 1995). 
iii. Sorting Test 
The D-KEFS Sorting Test was designed to isolate and measure multiple 
components of concept formation and problem solving abilities. The test 
consists of two card sets, with six cards in each, with various stimulus words 
and perceptual features. During Condition 1, Free Sorting, the examinee is 
required to sort the cards into two groups of three cards each, according to as 
many different categorization rules as possible (there are eight possible target 











solving behaviour. In addition, he/she must describe the concept he/she used 
to generate each sort, which allows for an assessment of the examinee's ability 
to explain the sorting concepts he/she used abstractly (Delis, Kaplan & 
Kramer, 2001). However, some examinees with impaired concept formation 
may also be impaired in their ability to initiate problem solving behaviour, 
which will lead to few incorrect description responses in Condition 1. A 
second condition has therefore been incorporated, the Sort Recognition 
condition, during which the examiner sorts the cards, and the examinee has to 
attempt to identity the concept used to generate the sort (Delis, Kaplan & 
Kramer, 2001). An early version of the test (the California Card Sorting Test) 
was found to be sensitive to deficits in multiple executive functions in patients 
with focal frontal lesions (Delis, Squire, Bihrle, & Massman, 1992). The 
cognitive demands made on the examinee by the D-KEFS Sorting test can be 
compared with those made by the more well-known Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (Delis, Kaplan and Kramer, 2001). Dorsolateral frontal patients have 
found to be significantly impaired on the latter task in comparison to patients 
with inferior frontal and posterior lesions (Milner, 1963). 
tv. Tower test 
The objective of this task is to move disks of various sizes across three pegs to 
build a designated tower in the fewest number of moves possible and to 
simultaneously follow a number of rules. It taps a variety of executive 
functions such as spatial planning, rule learning, inhibition of trial-and-error 
responding, and the ability to establish and maintain cognitive set (Delis, 
Kaplan and Kramer, 2001). The test consists of nine items of increasing 
level of difficulty. Patients with frontal damage have been found to be 
severely impaired on a very similar test, the Tower of London (Shallice, 1982 
cited in Fuster, 1989). 
j) Memory tests 
Although patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex do not suffer from a basic 
incapacity to form or to retain memories, they may exhibit memory deficits 
because of low drive and attentional deficits (Fuster, 1989). Given finding by 











correlated positively with frequency and informative richness of dream recall, 
deficits in memory posed a possible extraneous variable in dorsolateral frontal 
patients ability to recall their dreams. Verbal and visual memory was therefore 
assessed using two tests: the Babcock Story Recall test and the Rey Complex 
Figure Test. 
i. Babcock Story Recall Test 
In this test, a 21-unit story is used to measure immediate and delayed recall of 
verbal material. The original story developed by Babcock (1930 cited III 
Lezak, 1995) reads: 
December 6/ Last weeki a river/ overflowed/ in a small town! ten miles/ from 
Albany.! Water covered the streets/ and entered the houses.! Fourteen persons/ 
were drowned/ and 600 persons/ caught cold/ because of the dampness/ and 
cold weather'! In saving/ a boy/ who was caught/ under a bridge,! a man! cut 
his hands. 
The test was slightly adapted to make it more appropriate for a South African 
situation by changing the words "miles" to "kilometres" and "Albany" to 
"Knysna" (see Appendix A). The test was administered according to the 
standardized procedure described in Lezak (1995). 
ii. Rey Complex Figure 
The Rey Complex Figure designed by Rey (1941, as cited in Lezak, 1995) 
aims to investigate both perceptual organization and visual memory in brain-
damaged subjects. Following the standardized procedure described in Lezak 
(1995), subjects were asked to copy the figure, set out so that its length ran 
along the subject's horizontal plane, on a blank piece of paper. On completion 
of the copy trial the picture was removed and immediate recall was tested after 













Patients with focal frontal damage were selected from the neurosurgery and 
neurology wards of Groote Schuur hospital as identified hy their hospital notes and 
CT or MRI scan report. After a senior radiologist reviewed the scans. those patients 
with dorsolateral damage were approached by the researcher. told what participation 
in the study would involve. and asked whether they would like to participate. Patients 
who were willing to participate were asked to give written informed consent. As 
many of the patients were gravely ill and tired quickly. a flexible approach was taken 
to testing. Thus patients were typically tested over a period of 2-3 days. with about an 
hour of testing taking place on each day. Testing took place in the ward. but in two 
cases patients were discharged hdore testing could he completed. These patients 
were followed up at home. A similar approach to testing was used with control 
participants. who were selected from the orthopaedics ward after heing matched with 
frontal patients in terms of age and education and then recruited. 
3.7. Scoring and Experimental measures 
3.7.1. Most Recent Dream Report 
The Hall/Van de Castle system of dream analysis was used in order to code and 
suhsequently compare the dreams of dorsolateral frontal patients with those of normal 
controls (Hall & Van de Castle. Il)M cited in DomilofL [l)l)6). This system has the 
advantage that it is possible to achieve high inter-rater reliahility with it. since it has 
clearly defined categories and consists of nominal scales only. and is therefore not 
dependent on raters making difficult comparative judgements as in the case of 
hierarchical scales (Domhoff. [l)l)6). The Hall/Van de Castle system is an empirical, 
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Food and eating 
Elements from the past 
The HalllVan de Castle system is often used in order to understand the meaning of 
dreams in a specific population or to determine hO\\ people's dreams relate to their 
waking concerns (Domho1'1'. 1996). HO\vever. this was not the focus of the present 
study as the aim was to compare the overall quality. or typical 'dreamlikeness' of the 
dreams experienced hy dorsolateral frontal patients with those experienced by normal 
participants. Based on the four aspects highlighted hy Nielsen's (2000) definition of 
dreams. four content categories were created out of the various categories and 
subcategories of the HalllVan de Castle coding system. These were: i) Emotions. ii) 
BizalTe or Unrealistic Elements, iii) Sensory Impressions. and iv) Dramatic Intensity. 
These are briefly discussed below. 
I. EII/otions 
The emotion category of the HalllVan de Castle coding system measures any 
explicitly stated feelings present in the dream report and consists of five 
subcategories: anger. apprehension. sadness. confusion. and happiness. 
ii. Scnsor\" ill/pressions 
The extent to which sensory impressions were present was measured by a 
summation of the categories for characters. physical surroundings. and descriptive 
elements. 
iii. Unrealistic clell/cnts 
The presence of bizarre or unrealistic clements \\as assessed \\ith a separate 
subscale of the coding system. the Unrealistic Elements Scale (Domhoff. 1996. p. 
278). 
11', Drall/otic intcnsil\' 
The degree of "dramatic intensity" was obtained hy sllmmmg up the scores 
obtained on the following seven content categories: aggression. friendliness. sex. 
success. fai lure. misfortune. and good fortune (Dol11hoff. ]l)l)()). Both aggression 











category of its own and success and failure arc hoth part of the striving scale. 
Misfortune and good fortune form one broad category. 
Two blind raters rated each dream report according to these four categories after 
being given a small sample of dreams for training purposes. During the training 
session any amhiguities ahout coding categories were discussed and resolved. Inter-
rater reliahility, as estahlished with Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient, 
was high. The percentage perfect agreement on the 'emotion' category was 79('/(1, it 
was 99('lr for 'sensory impressions', 90(lr for 'unrealistic elements', and 94% for 
'dramatic intensity'. The relatively low percentage perfect agreement on the 
'emotion' category in comparison to the other categories can he explained in terms of 
the low frequency of emotions explicitly stated in dreams in this sample, as well as 
raters tendency to infer emotions from the contents of the dream despite being 
explicitly instructed otherwise. 
3.7.2. Orientation for Time and Place 
Orientation for time and place was assessed using five items each. with one point 
awarded for each correct answer, therehy providing a total orientation score out of 
ten. 
3.7.3. Digit Forward Test 
Digit span was established by administering 8 trials of increasing span length 
consisting of two items each. The test was discontinued when the participant was 
unable to conectly repeat back hoth items of any given trial. Thus digit span was 
determined by the trial in which the participant was ahle to pass at least one item. 
Because the Wechsler scoring system confounds information about length of span 
with information about the rei iabi Ii ty of span performance (Le7ak, 199:')), the 
recommended scoring system in \vhich the participant is awarded one point for each 
COlTect trial (Wechsler. 1981) was not used. Instead, the length of span of patients 
and controls were compared. 
3.7.4. DK-EFS subtests 
/. Trail Making Tesl (Condition 4: NUIIl/Jer-/J'llCl' SI\'itching) 
In order to evaluate whether participants had a deficit 1Il cognitive 











three types of errors were scored. These are: sequencll1g errors. which 
occur when an examinee makes a connection within the correct set of 
symbols (number or letters), but connects the \\Tong item within that set; 
set-loss e1Tors. which occur when an examinee fails to switch from one set 
of symbols to the other: and time-discontinue errors. v:hich occur when an 
examinee fails to connect one or more items because the time limit has 
elapsed. These errors where summed in order to obtain a total error score, 
\\hich reflects the degree of dysfunction on the task (Delis. Kaplan & 
Kramer. 20(1). 
II. Word-c%llr /nterf(>rcncc Test (Condition 3: !nhihition) 
Performance on this test is measured by the time taken to complete the 
condition. as it reflects the examinee's ability to inhibit the more automatic 
task of reading words in order the name the dissonant ink colours as 
quickly as possible. In addition, two types of errors were scored: corrected 
and uncorrected errors. These errors were summed in order to obtain a 
total error score. which reflects the severity of an examinee's impaired 
performance on this test (Delis. Kaplan & Kramer. 20(1). 
Ill. S'orring Test 
Examinees' ability to sort the cards was measured by the confirmed 
correct sort index. This measure is based on the number of initial. correct 
target sorts across both card sets of Condition I for which the description 
response received a score of at least 1 point. Examinees' ability to 
describe their s011ing concepts was measllred by the free sorting 
description score, which is based on the slim of correct description scores 
across both card sets of Condition I. The total number of COlTect 
description scores summed across hoth card sets on Condition 2 provided 
the sort recognition description score, which quantifies an examinee's 
ahility to describe the sorting concepts or rules used by the examiner to 










11', Flil \ 'C r Fcs! 
The total achievement score, which is the sum of achie\ement scores for all 
items administered, was used to estahlish examinees' proficiency at this 
task, In addition, the total numher of rule violations across all items 
administered was divided by the total numher of items administered in 
order to estahlish the Rule- Violation-Per-Item Ratio. Using this ratio 
cOlTects for varying levels of successful achievement (Delis, Kaplan & 
Kramer, 200 I), 
3.7.5. Memory Tests 
I. Ba!Jc()ck S!o!'\' Rcut/ f Te,\! 
Following the scoring instruction detailed in Lelak (1<)<)5). four points were 
added to the total numher of units recalled on immediate recall in order to 
equate for the second reading of the story before the delayed recall trial. The 
delayed recall score was estahlished by simply adding up the number of 
units recalled during this trial. 
II, Rc\' Co/Ilpfe.r Figllrc Test 
During all three trials the drawing sequence was recorded hy the examiner 
and scored according to the unit scoring system developed by Ostcrrieth 
(194-1-, as cited in Lelak, I <)()5, p, 570), The scoring system rcquires the 
examiner to consider each of the 18 units of the figure separately, The 
accuracy of each unit is appraised as \\ell as its relative position within the 
\\hole design. A maximum score of 36 points can he achieved for each trial 
admi n i stered, 
3.8. Statistical Analysis 
Due to the non-parametric nature of most of the data obtained on the vanous 
measures described above, the Mann-Whitney test for two independent samples was 
used, In these cases, p-valucs were estimated using the c.xact method, unless 
otherwise stated, A t-test for t\\iO independent samples \\as used when appropriate 










of the homogeneity of variances was violated (as tested by the Levene test). In these 
cases the analysis was repeated using the Mann-Whitney test. since this test does not 
make any a priori assumptions ahout the shape or the distribution (Howell. 1997). 
Effects were considered significant at the p < 0.0':; le\ cI. 
The dream reports of prefrontal patients and controls were compared uS1l1g 
Domhoffs (1996) recommended method. Dream reports from different groups may 
differ in length. and this may in turn influence the number of elements present in the 
dream (Domhoff. 1996). Since any significant differences in dream length would 
therefore have to be compensated for during analysis. the word-count of the dream 
reports produced by prefrontal patients and controls were compared before 
establishing whether there were any quantitative differences in the dreams of the two 
groups. Individual differences in report length will however still affect the 
frequencies of dream clements (Domholl. 1(96). To control of this. general 
categories were converted into a percentage of the total frequency of all categories 
present. Because the overall aim or the study was to compare the "dream-likeness" of 
the dreams experienced by dorsolateral prefrontal patients with that of controls. 
subcategories of each general category were not analysed. Such an analysis would in 
any case be meaningless due to the low frequency of some categories. and the small 
sample size. Effect size was detennined by comparing the percentage scores of each 
group on a specific category with each other after adjustment using Cohen's h 
statistic. Significant levels were determined by calculating z scores. All data was 
captured on Excel and analysed using the Statistica statistics package. 
4. Results 
4.1. Most Recent Dream Report 
Consistent \\ith Solms' (1997) findings. none of the prefrontal patients reported 
any subjective changes in their dreams since raIling ill. Analysis of the length of the 
dream reports produced by patients and controls shO\ved that the mean number of 
words in patients' dream reports was 83.7 whereas the mean number of words in 
controls' dream reports was 89.9 (Standard deviation 20.89 and 19.37 respectively). 
A f test comparing the two groups was non-significant [!( 12) = -0.57: p = 0.579], 
indicating there were no significant difference in the length of the dream reports 











In order to determine whether there were any quantitative differences in dreams of 
dorsolateral frontal patients and normal controls. the number of elements present for 
each content category were compared. No significant difference \\as detected 
between patients and controls in terms of the number of emotions present in their 
dreams [h = 0.149: z = 0.279: p = O.Y)]. There was also no significant difference 
between patients and controls in terms of dramatic intensity [h = o.n I: z = 0.432: p = 
0.33]. Similarly. there \vas no statistical difference hetween patients and controls in 
terms of the numher of sensory impressions present [h = 0.124: z = O.n2: p = 0.41]. 
Finally. there was also no statistical di fference hetween patients and controls in terms 
of the numher of unrealistic elements present in their dreams [h = 0.148: z = 0.277: p 
= 0.39]. No significant differences were therefore found bet\veen dosolateral frontal 
patients and control participants in terms of any of the content categories. 
Table 2 
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Frequencies of sub-cateuories for the ~eneral cate~or\': Unrealistic Elements Scale 
---"----~-~-------~ ... ""-~--~---"--"'.""--'---~"-------
Patients Controls 
Unusual Activities 0 0 
Unusual Occurrences I 
Distorted Ohjects or arrangements of ohjects 






Frequencies and percentages for each major content category 
Patients Controls 
f % f C' k 
Emotion 4 6% 7 10% 
Dramatic intensity 9 14% 5 r-'0 
Sensory impression 51 7r,s 59 82°_0 
Unusual elements 2 3% p-_0 
_____ '~u ___ ~~~~_ .. " 
4.2. Orientation for Time and Place 
o 
o 
The prefrontal group obtained an average orientation score of 6.7 as opposed to an 
average score of 9.9 obtained hy control participants (standard deviation 2.37 and 
0.38 respectively). When a t-test was performed in order to compare the orientation 
score of prefrontal patients and controls, the assumption of homogeneity of variances 
was violated [Levene F( 12) = 7.609: p = 0.0171. The analysis \\-as therefore repeated 
using the Mann-Whitney test. which revealed a significant difference between 
patients and controls I L' = :'i: / = -2.49; P = 0.0 III. Prcfrontal patients wcre therefore 











4.3. Digit Span Forward Test 
Prefrontal patients \\ere found to have an a\eragc digit span of 6, whereas control 
participants had an average digit span of 6.14 (standard deviation 0.57 and 0.69 
respectively. This difference was found to be non-significant [l] = 21.5: z = -0.383; p 
= 0.710]. 
4.4. Subtests of the D-KEFS 
l. Trail Making Test (Condition 4: NUII/her-Leffer S\\'ilching) 
No significant difference was found between patients and control participants in 
terms of completion time on Trail Making test [t(12) = 1.912: p = 0.08]. However, 
patients made significantly more errors than control participants on this test [U = 7: z 
= 2.236: p = 0.0261. 
II. Word-colo"r Interference Tesl (ConC/ilion 3: Inliihilion) 
No significant difference was found between patients and controls in terms of 
completion time on the inhibition trail of the Word-Colour test [t( 12) = 1.705; P = 
0.114]. Similarly, the result was non-significant when the analysis was repeated using 
the Mann-Whitney test [U = 18, Z = 0.83, P = 0.486J. However, patients made 
significantly more errors than control participants r {! = 8.5, z = 2.044, P = OJ)38] on 
this test. 
Ill. Sorling Tesl 
Patients were able to sort significantly fe\\cr groups of cards correctly than 
controls [U = 8: z = -2.108: p = 0.0381. They also scored significantly lower than 
controls in terms of their ability to describe their sorts rU = 3: z = -2.747: p = 0.004]. 
In addition patients' recognition description score was significantly lower than that of 
controls r {! = 5: z = -2.492: p = 0.0 III. 
1\'. TOH'er lesl 
There was no significant difference between patients and controls on the total 
achievement score [[! = 10.5: 7 = -1.788: p = O'(l731. When a t-test was performed in 
order to compare the rule-violations-per-item rati(} of patients and controls, the 











0.0 II]. The analysis was therefore repeated uSll1g the Mann-Whitney test, which 
revealed a significant difference between patients and controls [U = 7: z = 2.236: p = 
0.026]. Patients therefore had a significantly higher error ratio than controls. 
Table 7 
Results of DK-EFS subtests 
Patients (n =7) Controls (n =7) 
Trai I making 4 (Completion time) 208.6 (J7.11 ) 161.9(52.9J) 
Trail making 4 (Total errors) 10.6 (9AJ)* 1.1 (0.09) 
Word-colour Inhibition (Completion time) 114.7 (45.J8) 82.1(22.22) 
Word-colour Inhibition (Total errors) I JA (15.16)* 1.9( 1.(5) 
Sorting Test (Total confirmed correct sorts) J.J( 1.79)* 5.6( I.J9) 
Sorting Test (Free sorting description score) 10.0(4.62)* 21.4(6.39) 
Sorting Test (Recognition description score) 12.0(7.92)* 24.6(5.38) 
Tower Test (Total achievement score) 10.7(5.99) 15.0(0.58) 
Tower Test violations item ration 1.06 0.1 (0.11 
A verages with S.D. in parentheses arc reported. Underlined values arc significantly 
different from Control Group \"hen cOJl\ertcd to rank sum \,t/ues: ":P < fl.05. 
4.5. Memory Tests 
I. Ba/Jcock StOlT RCC(t/! Test 
Significant differences were found hetween patients and controls on both the 
immediate [U = 0.00: z = -J. n I: p = 0.0005] and delayed recall r U = 1.00: z = -3.00; 
p = 0.00 I] trials of the Babcock Story Recall tests. This indicates that patients 
recalled significantly fewer units of information than controls on both trials. 
11. Rn' emlle/e.r Figllrc 
A significant difference was found between patients and control subjects with 
regard to the number of units produced on the Rey Copy trial l [1 = 7.5: z = -2.172: p 
= 0.0261. A significant difference was also found between patients and controls in 
terms of the number of units recalled on immediate recall III = 9: z = - 1.981: p = 
0.047]. but when the more stringent exact probability was applied. this result was not 
found to be significant r exact p = 0.0531. No signi ficant difference between patients 
and controls \vas found in the number of units recalled during delayed recall [U = 9.5: 











Results of tests 
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Babcock (Delayed) 6.0(].32)** 
ReyCopy 27.1(10.29)'" 
Rey Immediate Recall 









Averages with S.D. in parentheses are reported. Underlined values are significantly 
different from Control Group when converted to rank sum values; *P < 0.05; 
**P<O.O I. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Unchanged dreaming and damage to the dorsolateral frontal lobe 
The current study replicated Solms' (1997) finding that patients with damage to the 
dorsolateral frontal lobes report no changes in the subjective experience of their 
dreams. In addition. \ve were ahle to extend his findings by showing that when a 
content analysis of the dream reports produced hy prefrontal patients and control 
participants was performed. no statistical di Ilcrenccs could he detected between the 
two groups on four major content categories. Moremer. damage to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal convexity did no seem to affect the length of the dream reports produced hy 
these patients. These results are consistent with a number of neuroimaging studies 
that showed deactivation of the dorsolateral frontal lobes during both REM and non-
REM sleep (Anderson et aI., 1998; Braun et al.. 1997; Madsen et al.. 1991; Maquet et 
al.. 1(97). 
Damage to the dosolateral prefrontal area was associated with a significant deficit 
'-- '--
III verbal memory. but not in visual memory. Given the finding that prefrontal 
patients did not produce significantly shorter dreams. or dreams with a significantly 
lower frequency of dream elements on any of the content categories. this seems to 
indicate that deficits in verhal memory do not adversely affect dream recall. 
However. this finding is inconsistent with that of Cathala et al. (1983) who reported 
positive cOIl'elations between tests of verhal memory (and \isual memory) with dream 
frequency and informative richness of dream recall in frontal patients. This 
discrepancy can probably be explained in terms of methodological differences 











differences in the location of the lesion in the frontal group. The lack of statistical 
differences between the dreams produced by patients with damage to the prefrontal 
lobes and normal participants therefore indicate that damage to this area causes no 
significant changes in the dreams of patients with damage to this area. 
5.2. Executive dysfunction and the formal features of dreams 
According to Hobson (2002) dreams have a number of formal features. amongst 
which internally generated perceptions and emotions are the t\\O most fundamental. 
In addition. dreams arc characteri/ed hy a numher of cogniti\e deficits such as a loss 
of self-reflective awareness. loss of orientation stahility. loss of directed thought. 
reduction in logical reasoning. poor memory. and loss of volition (Hobson. 2002). 
Various researchers have hypothesised that deacti vation of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. and other heteromodal association areas. such as the inferior parietal cortices. 
during dreaming may account for some of these cognitive deficits in dreams (Braun et 
al. 1997: Hobson et al.. 2000: Maquet et al. 1996: Solms. 20(0). 
In the present study. damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was associated 
with a poor performance on a number of executive tests. Thus the dorsolateral 
frontal group were found to have significant difficulty in acquiring and maintaining 
cognitive set as evidenced by a significantly higher error score on the Trail Making 
Test. as well as a higher rule-violations-per item ratio than the control group on the 
Tower Test. The prefrontal group's high error ratio on the Tower Tcst also indicates 
rule-breaki ng heha vi our and a defici tin the ahi I i ty to use m i stakcs to gu i de future 
behaviour. Deficits in problem solving behaviour were noted in the prefrontal group. 
as illustrated by their significantly decreased ability to initiate prohlem-solving 
behaviour compared to controls on the Sorting Test. In addition. thc prefrontal group 
were found to be concrete. as evidenced by del'ecti ve concept formation ski lis on both 
the Free Sorting condition and Sort Recognition condition of the Sorting Tcst. 
In our sample. attentional deficits were revealed hy the prefrontal group's poor 
performance on the Trail Making Test and thc Stroop Test. Both these tests are 
considered to be sensitive to frontal lobe damage. and to attentional deficits in 
particular (Stuss &: Benson. 1(86). Comersely. no significant differences were found 
between prefrontal patients and control participants in terms of Digit Span. another 











that digit span does not consistently show decline after frontal lone damage (Stuss & 
Benson. 1986). 
An attentional deficit could exrlain our findings of significantly poorer recall of 
verbal material by the prefrontal group. hoth immediately and after a substantial delay 
as tested by the Babcock Story Recall Test. According to Fuster's (1989) theoretical 
model of frontal lobe functions. the lack of drive associated with damage to the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may in turn affect these patients ability to direct and 
maintain attention. As a consequence thereof. '"the patient fails to memorize the 
essential material for reaching conceptual and hehavioural goals (Fuster. 1989, p. 
136). Thus the prefrontal cortex is seen as suhserving the temporary retention of 
information necessary for goal-directed behaviour (Fuster. 1989: Luria. 1966/1980). 
Fuster's (1989) theory is holstered hy recent findings that the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is active during short-term memory tasks and during free recall (Fletcher. Frith. 
& Rugg. 1997: Wagneret aL 19(8). 
Attentional deficits could also explain why the prefrontal group was found to be 
significantly less orientated for time and place than the control group. The ability to 
be aware of oneself in relation to one's surroundings "requires consistent and reliable 
integration of attention, perception. and memory" (Lezak. 1995. p. ]]5). In frontal 
patients the ability to direct attention and sustain it over a period of time is impaired 
(Fuster, 1989: Stuss & Benson. 1986). 
Could the lack of signi ficant change I n the production of dreams sunsequent to 
damage to the dorsolateral frontal lohes be explained hy these cognitive deficits 
associated with damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal lohes'? According to both 
Hohson (~OO~) and Solms (I (97) they could. 
5.2.1. Orientational deficits and dream bizarreness 
As shown in the cunent study. damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal lobes is 
associated with orientational deficits. which arc III turn associated with attentional 
deficits (Stuss & Benson. 1(86). In dreams. orientational instability leads to plot 
discontinuity. where time. place. persons and actions change without notice (Hobson, 
2002: ~005). According to Hohson. plot discontinuity along with plot incongruity 
(the mismatching features of characters. objects. actions. or settings) and cognitive 
uncertainty (explicit vagueness) arc the qualitativc characteristics of dream 











may account for these orientational deficits, and thus explain the bizan-e nature of 
dreams to some extent (Hohson et aI., 2()OO). 
In addition to these orientational dcl'icits. the dreaming hrain has a tendency to 
confabulate. due to an impairment In memory (discussed in more detail below). 
These cognitive deficits, together with visual hallucinations. are \ery similar to a 
functional delirium. Thus Hohson (1997: 2(04) suggests that the dreaming hrain 
suffers from a psychosis, similar to that associated with drug or alcohol ahuse. This 
position is similar to that of SolIns and Turnhull (2002), who argue that "the 
functional anatomy of dreaming is almost identical to that of schizophrenic 
psychosis" (p. 213). However. Domhoff (200)) has criticized this characterization of 
dreaming as a psychotic state. Thus he argues that Hobson's and Solms' emphasis on 
dream bizarreness is misplaced and is not supported hy the empirical findings on 
dream content. In addition, DomholT (2005) argues that findings by Hobson and co-
workers (Rittenhouse, Stickgold & Hobson, 1(94) which indicate a high frequency of 
abrupt scene and character changes do not necessari I vindicate that dreams are 
inherently bizarre as such events happen in waking fantasy as well. Although this 
may he the case, Domhoff (199)) does not consider that in \vaking life, unlike in 
dreams (and psychosis), we are able to reflect on the incongruities and impossihilities 
of our fantasies (Kahn & Hohson, 2(05). 
5.2.2. Self-reflective awareness and reduced logical reasoning 
Self-reflecti ve awareness, also called meta-avvareness, can be defined as the 
"awareness of mental life itself' (Cicogna & Bossinelli, 200 I). In other words, self-
reflective awareness involves being aware of the phenomenal experience of ohjects or 
events. Self-reflective awareness can he seen as the hasis of intelligent hehaviour. It 
implies the acquisition and use of knowledge in an organized and deliherate way 
(Stuss & Benson, 1(86). The characteristics of self-reflective a\vareness closely 
resemble those attributed to prefrontal functions. leading Stuss and Benson (1986) to 
hypothesise that self-awareness is the highest attrihute of the frontal lobes. 
Impairment in self-reflective awareness can be ohserved in the shallowness of 
interest loss of self-concern and impairment of self-monitoring commonly associated 
with damage to the prefrontal area (Fuster, 1989: Stuss & Benson, 1(86). In the 
cun-ent study, these defi ci ts were i lIust rated hy clorsol ateral frontal patients' 










the Stroop Test in comparison to controls. Although we are not claiming that self-
reflective awareness can be localized exclusively to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
damage to this area does seem to impair these patients' ability to monitor their 
behaviour. 
In dreams, self-reflected awareness is functionally expressed as "reality testing": 
the ability to reflect and recognize that one is dreaming instead of having an 
experience that is coming from the real world (Bosinelli, 1995; Cicogna & Bosinelli, 
2001). Studies indicate that this ability is absent in 90-95% of dreams (Cicogna & 
Bosinelli, 2001). In addition, a recent study has shown that we suffer from a specific 
kind of impairment in logical reasoning whilst dreaming (Kahn & Hobson, 2005). 
Thus it seems that our ability to think about the dream (i.e. to detect the incongruities 
in the hallucinatory experience) is impaired. Although thinking within the context of 
the dream was not found to be common, this was found to be rational and thus similar 
to our waking thought (Kahn & Hobson, 2005). The finding that metacognition, 
'knowing that we are hallucinating' is impaired during dreaming was attributed to 
deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and precuneus (Kahn & Hobson, 
2005). Findings that metacognition is restored during lucid dreaming, has led Kahn 
and Hobson (2005) to speculate that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex becomes 
reactivated in this state. In patients with damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
such reactivation may not occur. However, these speculations still need to be 
validated by brain imaging studies. 
5.2.3. Poor memory within the dream 
As discussed above, damage to the prefrontal cortex is associated with a specific, 
attention related, memory impairment (Fuster, 1989). Although dream elements often 
appear to arise from waking events, this does not imply that episodic memory is 
necessarily used for dream construction (Stickgold et aI., 2001). Episodic memory 
can be defined as "a memory of an event, recalled as an integrated whole, with the 
actual waking event (or "episode") replayed in one's mind" (Stickgold et aI., 2001). 
Episodic memories are thought to be dependent on the hippocampus for their 
integration (Schacter & Tulving, 1994). Findings that dream elements only reflect 
one or two aspects of the waking experience, instead of fully integrated episodic 
memories (Stickgold et aI., 2001), seem to indicate that dream elements are not 











hippocampal formation during REM sleep, as well as the deactivation of the 
dorsolateral frontal lobes during both REM and non-REM may account for this 
phenomenon (Stickgold et al., 2001). Impairment of episodic memory during 
dreaming limits our access to facts that are readily available during waking life 
(Hobson, 2005). Thus, for example, dream characters known to us are often not 
represented accurately in our dreams (Khan, Pace-Scott & Hobson, 2002) and 
important information (such as that the character is no longer alive, for example), is 
inaccessible (Hobson, 2005). Reduced activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
during dreaming may, in part, explain why we are unable to recall accurately in our 
dreams. 
5.2.4. Volition and the dorsolateral prefrontal lobes 
Damage to the prefrontal convexity is associated with a disorder of goal-directed 
behaviour (Fuster, 1989; Luria, 1966/1980). As discussed above, this disorder is seen 
as the consequence of a fundamental impairment in the ability to temporally organize 
behaviour (Fuster, 1989). Behaviourally, it manifests as concreteness, stereotypical 
behaviour (Fuster, 1989), and a dissociation between knowing and doing (Luria, 
1966/1980). Deficits in temporal integration are readily demonstrated by 
neuropsychological tests such as the weST (Fuster, 1989). In the present study 
dorsolateral prefrontal patients' difficulties in temporal integration were illustrated by 
concreteness and deficits in problem solving ability on the Sorting Test. 
During dreaming, deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal lobes, together with 
the inhibition of spinal motoneurons, will prevent appetitive interests, aroused due to 
external sensory stimulation as well as endogenous stimulation, such as REM 
activation, from expressing themselves in volitional motor action (Solms, 1997). 
Thus deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during dreaming does not only 
account for some of the striking formal features of dreams, but also serves a very 
specific function. This function is presumably the preservation of sleep (Solms, 
1997). 
5.3. Summary and Conclusion 
The present study has been able to verify Solms' (1997) observation that damage 
to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not cause any subjective changes in these 











dorsolateral prefrontal patients are not significantly different from those of normal 
controls when a content analysis of four major content categories was carried out. 
Our results are therefore consistent with the available clinico-anatomical (Solms, 
1997) and neuroimaging evidence (Anderson et aI., 1998; Braun et aI., 1997; Madsen 
et aI., 1991; Maquet et aI., 1997), which point to a deactivation of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex during dreaming. In addition, the present study has managed to 
avoid some of the methodological problems associated with some of these previous 
studies. Thus we have made use of a more objective method of comparing the dreams 
of patients with damage to the frontal convexity with those of normal participants than 
Solms (1997) did in his exploratory study. Moreover, we have avoided the possible 
confounding variable of conflating REM sleep with dreaming, which is often the case 
in neuroimaging studies (Solms, 1997). 
Damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not seem to have any significant 
impact on the production of dreams. A careful look at the cognitive deficits 
associated with damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex seem to indicate that 
deactivation of this area during sleep may account for many of the cognitive deficits 
associated with dreams to some extent (Hobson et aI., 2000). Thus the cognitive 
deficits exhibited by our sample of dorsolateral prefrontal patients would not affect 
the production of dreams in any of the ways assessed in this study, because 
deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (and the attending cognitive deficits) 
is an inherent part of the dream process. Deactivation of this area may prevent the 
expression of ideas into action, thereby serving the function of preserving of sleep 
(Solms, 1997). However, further research is necessary to confirm the relationship 
between the apparent cognitive deficits in dreams with specific aspects of executive 
dysfunction. 
5.4. Limitations 
The sample size of the current study was particularly small due to numerous 
problems encountered during the data collection phase. Issues surrounding language, 
and cultural variations in terms of the meaning and significance of dreams in 
particular, had an impact on sample size and selection. A number of Xhosa speaking 
participants denied having any dreams and declined, rather forcefully, to participate in 
the study. It was only when the researcher realized the word "dream" in Xhosa has 











understood. Thus the word "dream" can be translated as iphupha, meanmg an 
ordinary dream, or as umbono meaning "vision" (or dreams from the ancestors). 
Having the latter experience may indicate that one has been called to be an 
ukuthwasa, a healer. Although care was taken to use the correct Xhosa word (three of 
the prefrontal patients and four of the control participants were Xhosa first-language 
speakers) to indicate the mental experience we were interested in, these kinds of 
cultural factors may have had an impact on the kinds of dreams which were reported. 
Varying degrees of fluency in English may also have affected these patients' ability to 
describe their mental experiences, as well as their performance on some of the tests 
we conducted. Although these factors should be noted, their impact on the study is 
not negative, since they affected both the prefrontal and the control group. 
Care was taken to ensure that participants reported their most recent dream. 
However, although Domhoff (1996) argues that the Most Recent Dream method gives 
a representative sample of all dreams, Chapman and Underwood (2000) have pointed 
out that there is a tendency toward recalling dramatic, and therefore more memorable, 
dreams. Thus the study could be expanded upon by collecting a number of dreams 
from prefrontal patients and controls over a period of a few weeks. 
The small sample size did not allow for comparisons to be made between patients 
with damage to the left or right dorsolateral frontal lobes. Future research could 
expand on our observations by making use of a larger sample, which will allow for 
comparisons to be made between right and left dorsolateral prefrontal patients. In 
addition, the small sample size excluded the possibility of making within group 
correlations between the scores on cognitive tests and dream content scores, for 
example, correlations between participants' scores on the test of verbal memory with 
dream length. 
The present study only assessed the general dream characteristics of patients with 
damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and compared this with the general dream 
characteristics of normal participants. Future research should focus on measuring and 
comparing the specific cognitive deficits associated with dreaming, such as loss of 
self-reflective awareness, loss or orientational stability, reduction in logical reasoning, 
poor memory, and loss of volition in the dreams of patients with damage to the 
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Date of Onset: 
Date of Admission: 
Date of Discharge: 
Type of stroke/ cause of lesion: 
Psychiatric history 
History of Alcohol/Drug Use 
Description of Current Condition/ Medical History 
Brain Scan 
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Rey Complex Figure Test 
































Bahcock Story Recall 
December 6/ Last weeki a river/ overflowed/ in a small town/ ten kilometres/ 
from Knysna.! Water covered the streets/ and entered the houses.! Fourteen 
persons/ were drowned/ and 600 persons/ caught cold/ because of the 
dampness/ and cold weather.! In saving/ a boy/ who was caught/ under a 
bridge,! a man/ cut his hands. 
Immediate Recall 
Total Units ____ _ 
Delayed Recall 












Inteniew Date: _____ _ 
Date of onset of neurological illness: ______ _ 
Do you still dream at night? Yes/No 
If yes: 
Could you please tell me your II/ost rfccilt drcall/? But before you start could you tell 
me the date this dream occurred: . Was this hefore or after you 
became ill? 
Could you now describe the dream exactly and in as much detail as you can 
remember it. Please tell me about anything you saw. heard. smelled. tasted or felt in 
your dream. Specifically, please descrihe where your dream took place and whether 
that place was familiar to you: give me description of the characters in your dream 
(people or animals) and tell me about everything which happened in your dream. no 
matter how strange it might have seemed. Also can you tell me of any emotions you 
experienced in the dream. 
If No: 
Do you know what a "dream" is'? ______ _ 
Have you ever had a drcam'? _____ _ 
When did you have your last dream? (approximate date) ______ _ 
Was that before or after you fell ill'? _____ _ 
Do you think that you have had dreams in the past. hut did not remember 
them'? -----
Do you think that you still dream now. but do not remember them'? ______ _ 
Has your ability to rememher your dreams hecome (a) hetter. (h) worse. (c) remained 
unchanged. or (d) are you unsure? 
Do you think your dreams have changed since you hecame ill? Yes/No 

































































I mpul si veness 
Distractibi lity 
Socially Inappropriate Behaviour 
Rule Breaking Behaviours 













Appendix B: Information Sheet 
Title of the Project: 
Dreaming and the dorsolateral frontal lobes: Towards a better understanding of 
the mechanism of dreaming. 
• You are invited to participate as a subject in a psychological study. Please read 
this information sheet carefully and do not hesitate to ask the researcher for any 
additional information. 
• The overall purpose of the investigation is to explore and evaluate different 
aspects of dreaming following brain damage. 
• As a participant of the study you will he asked to recall and describe in detail 
some of your dreams. You will also have to complete some neuropsychological 
tests. Your answers may he audio-recorded. 
• There are no anticipated risks involved in this research. hut if you should 
experience mental and/or physical fatigue. or any form of psychological distress 
please be aware that you should inform the investigator immediately. 
• It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and asked to sign a consent form. 
If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw from the study at any time, 
without having to give a reason and without this affecting future treatment. 
• The confidentiality of your answers and identity \\ i II he protected. All audio-
recordings made will be suitably anonymised, securely stored. made accessible 
only to the investigator and destroyed and the end of the project. In discussions of 
the results in the research report fal se i ni ti al s wi II he used to identi fy i ndi vidual 
participants. 
• This study is an educational project. forming part of a Masters degree in 
psychology and the University of Cape To"n. 
• The study is heing reviewed hy the Department of Psychology's ethics committee. 
• If you have any questions regarding this study. or concerns regarding the manner 
in which the study was conducted or would like to be informed of the results when 
the study is completed. please feel free to contact the researcher or her supervisor. 
Researcher: Tania Badenhorst 
Tel. 021-447 8942 
:1 1 














Title of the Project: 
Dreaming and the dorsolateral frontal lobes: Towards a better understanding of 
the mechanism of dreaming. 
Have you read the Subject Information Sheet 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and 
di scuss the study? 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all of your questions'? 
Have you recei ved enough information about the study'? 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
• at any time 
• without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
• and without affecting your future treatment'? 
Do you understand that some or your answers 
in the study will be audiotaped? 
Do you consent to the confidential use of these recordings 
for scientific purposes? 
Have you been given a copy of the information sheet 
And this consent form. 
Signed _______ _ Date _______ _ 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ________ _ 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
Un
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wn
